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Abstract
We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration by a partially ver-
tically integrated firm that competes with non-integrated firms both upstream and down-
stream. We show that vertical integration is procompetitive under fairly general conditions.
It can be anticompetitive only if the ex ante degree of integration is relatively large. In-
terestingly, vertical integration is more likely to be anticompetitive if the industry is less
concentrated. These results are in line with recent empirical evidence. In addition, we
show that even when vertical integration is procompetitive, it is not necessarily welfare
enhancing.
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1 Introduction
Over the last two decades substantial progress has been made on identifying pro- and an-
ticompetitive effects of vertical mergers. After the Chicago School critique of the relatively
aggressive enforcement policy on vertical mergers in the 1960’s, several theories have emerged
that base the potential competitive effects of vertical integration on more solid game-theoretic
ground. Yet, there is no general consensus under which conditions a vertical merger is likely
to benefit or harm consumers. The elimination of double marginalization has been identified
as a major efficiency gain from vertical integration. On the other hand, the merging parties
may be inclined to raise the input prices to their rivals and thereby induce market foreclosure.
As a consequence of this trade-off, vertical mergers are often judged by antitrust authorities
and courts on a case-by-case basis. General conclusions under which conditions either effect
dominates are not easily gained.1
Moreover, many models that identify different effects of vertical mergers are not readily
applicable for policy implications because they are unsatisfactory in two important aspects.
First, merging parties often claim to merge because of efficiency gains in production that lead
to cost reductions. This means that they not only avoid double marginalization but are also
able to produce the output good in a different and more efficient way than without integration.2
Second, firms that have oligopolistic market power in the downstream market often also exert
oligopsonistic market power when buying the intermediate goods. However, these effects are
not considered in many important and well-established models on vertical integration (e.g.
Salinger, 1988; Ordover, Saloner, and Salop, 1990; Hart and Tirole, 1990; Choi and Yi, 2000;
Chen, 2001).
A notable exception is Riordan (1998), who considers a model with a dominant firm and
a competitive fringe in the downstream market. To produce the final good, firms need a fixed
input, termed capacity, that is competitively offered on an upward sloping supply curve. The
dominant firm exerts market power both downstream and on the input market. The more
capacity a firms owns, the lower are its production costs of the final good. Therefore, the
model is not open to the two criticisms above. If the dominant firm integrates backwards, it
1For recent surveys on the effects of vertical mergers, see Church (2008), Rey and Tirole (2007) and Riordan
(2008).
2For example, Church (2008) argues that one of the reasons why vertical mergers are complicated to evaluate
is that the incentives to integrate often arise because of non-price efficiencies (in contrast to the efficiency of
internalizing price effects such as double marginalization) and are usually not attributable to market power
effects.
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acquires more capacity and so produces more output. On the other hand, since the demand
for capacity increases, the price of capacity increases as well and so fringe firms are foreclosed.
Riordan (1998) obtains the powerful result that the second effect always dominates and, thus,
that vertical integration is anticompetitive, i.e. leads to a decrease in output and to an increase
in the final good price. However, a drawback of Riordan’s model is that it applies only to market
structures where the final good market is comprised of a dominant firm facing a competitive
fringe.
The present paper provides an analysis of a model with an oligopolistic downstream market
where the structure is otherwise very close to Riordan (1998). We obtain the following results.
First, vertical integration is procompetitive under a fairly wide array of circumstances. In the
extreme, even monopolizing the downstream market can enhance consumer welfare because
the integrated firm expands its quantity by a very large extent after integrating. Thus, the
policy implications of the present paper differ from those of the dominant firm model in that
they suggest a more permissive approach to vertical mergers. Second, we find that vertical
integration is more likely to be procompetitive if the ex ante degree of integration of the
integrating firm is relatively low and if the concentration of the industry is relatively high,
i.e. if the number of competitors is small. The former result is intuitive and policy relevant.
The latter contrasts with the common wisdom that vertical mergers are suspicious especially
when firms have considerable market power.3 Third, we show that in the limit as the number
of competitors becomes large, vertical integration is always anticompetitive. Therefore, in
the limit our model encompasses the one of Riordan (1998), which shows that his model is a
good approximation for market structures in which competitors have only little market power.
Fourth, even if it is procompetitive, vertical integration is not necessarily welfare increasing.
Thus, procompetitive but welfare reducing mergers are possible. Last, there exist critical
thresholds for input and output market shares for an integrating firm above which further
vertical integration is anticompetitive. Both market shares are very similar. This is useful
for antitrust policy because these market shares are typically relatively easy to observe for
antitrust authorities. Since both critical thresholds fall in the number of competitors, antitrust
authorities should be the more suspicious about vertical mergers the larger is the number of
firms.
3For example, Lafontaine and Slade (2007) note that most empirical studies on vertical integration were
conducted for highly concentrated markets because evidence for foreclosure is thought most likely to be found
there.
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The intuition behind our main result is the following. As in the dominant firm model,
backward integration has a procompetitive efficiency effect because the integrated firm produces
more output thanks to its lower production cost and an anticompetitive foreclosure effect
because rival firms lower their capacity and produce less. However, in an industry with a
dominant firm and a competitive fringe only the dominant firm has market power. Thus, the
dominant firm has only little incentive to expand its quantity after a capacity increase because
it wants to keep the output price high. Therefore, it utilizes its capacity less efficiently after
integration. In contrast, in an oligopolistic market all firms exert market power, and so each of
them is inclined to restrict its quantity relative to capacity. As a consequence, they all utilize
their capacity less efficiently than a competitive fringe firm does, and so the quantity reduction
of a non-integrated firm in oligopoly after foreclosure is smaller than the reduction resulting
from exit of a fringe firm that has no market power. Therefore, the aggregate reaction of non-
integrated competitors is relatively weak which renders vertical integration procompetitive for
a broad range of circumstances.
The intuitions for our other results can now be grasped from the above explanation. If a
firm becomes more integrated, its production costs fall and, therefore, it benefits to a larger
extent from a higher final good price. Thus, it has an incentive to curb its quantity expansion
and so it utilizes its capacity less efficiently. This explains why vertical integration is more likely
to be anticompetitive if the merging firm is already integrated to a large extent. It also helps to
understand why procompetitive but welfare reducing mergers can occur. Vertical integration
changes the cost structure by shifting more capacity to the integrated firm that uses it less
efficiently. This does not play a role when considering just the effect on final output but it is
important for overall welfare. Therefore, welfare may fall although output rises. Finally, the
aggregate reaction of competitors is larger, the more competitors are present. Thus, if there
are many small firms, their aggregate capacity and quantity reduction as a reaction to vertical
integration is larger. This explains why vertical integration is more likely to be anticompetitive
if the industry is less concentrated, i.e. if the number of firms is large.
The empirical predictions of our model are consistent with recent evidence. For example,
Hortac¸su and Syverson (2007) study vertical integration in the cement and ready-mixed con-
crete industries. They find that output rises and prices fall if vertical integration increases and
show that this can be explained by the expansion of larger vertically integrated firms at the
expense of non-integrated firms. In addition, they demonstrate that via vertically integrat-
4
ing a firm gets larger, i.e. produces more final output, but does not become more productive
per se. Both of these results are in line with our findings that an integrated firm produces a
larger quantity but utilizes its capacity less efficiently. Lafontaine and Slade (2007) present a
comprehensive review of empirical studies on the effects of vertical integration for several in-
dustries. They show that the vast majority of these studies find only weak empirical evidence
for the foreclosure effect but document strong efficiency effects. In particular, the efficiency
effect dominates the foreclosure effect in almost all studies, and, therefore, vertical integration
has led to a fall in the final good price in almost all cases.4
Our paper extends and complements Riordan’s (1998) study. We show that his results
are robust in that they obtain in the limit of the oligopolistic model when the number of
competitors becomes large, but that the conclusions and policy implications differ when the
competitors possess significant market power. As mentioned, most of the literature on vertical
integration is concerned with the trade-off between avoidance of double marginalization and
foreclosure. For example, Hart and Tirole (1990) or Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990),
where no efficiency gains from vertical integration are present, are only concerned with the
foreclosure motives. In Salinger (1988), Choi and Yi (2000) and Chen (2001) both effects
are present but although the downstream market is comprised of an oligopoly or a duopoly,
downstream firms have no market power in the intermediate good market. A recent model
that incorporates both effects and additionally allows downstream firms to exert market power
in the intermediate good market is Hendricks and McAfee (2009). However, when analyzing
vertical mergers they keep the downstream price fixed and suppose that the market structure
consists of no vertical integration at the outset. Under these assumptions they show that
output increases with vertical mergers. In contrast, in our model the downstream price is
flexible and, as argued above, we show that a crucial variable to determine the competitive
effects of vertical integration is the degree to which the industry is already integrated. Nocke
and White (2007) analyze a different aspect of vertical mergers, namely whether it facilitates
upstream collusion. They show that this is indeed the case because vertical integration reduces
the number of buyers for rival firms and, thus, they have less incentives to deviate from the
collusive agreement by reducing their prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model and Section
4Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien, and Vita (2005) survey recent empirical evidence on vertical mergers and reach
a similar conclusion, namely that there is strong support that vertical mergers are procompetitive and that
instances where they are unambiguously negative are difficult to find.
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3 presents the equilibrium. In Section 4 we derive the competitive effects of vertical integration.
Section 5 analyzes the effects of vertical integration on social welfare. In Section 6 we discuss
the empirical evidence and the policy implications of the model. Section 7 concludes. All proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
2 The Model
The model is adapted from Riordan (1998) with some minor differences with respect to timing.
The main difference is that we consider a downstream oligopoly in contrast to a dominant firm
and a competitive fringe. There are two types of firms, one (partially) vertically integrated
firm, which we index by I and N ≥ 1 non-integrated firms. A typical non-integrated firm is
indexed by j.5
All firms produce a homogenous good and compete a` la Cournot on the downstream market,
where the inverse demand function is P (Q) with P ′(Q) < 0. So P (Q) is the market clearing
price for aggregate quantity Q ≡ qI +
∑N
j=1 qj . The cost function of firm j ∈ {1, ..., N} for
production of qj units is given by
c(qj , kj) = kjC
(
qj
kj
)
,
where kj is firm j’s production cost reducing capacity and C
′(qj/kj) ≥ 0 and C
′′(qj/kj) > 0.
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The integrated firm I has a cost advantage of γ ≥ 0 per unit of output.7 Therefore, its cost
function can be written as
c(qI , kI) = kIC
(
qI
kI
)
− γqI .
As a consequence, marginal costs for all firms are increasing in the produced quantity for given
capacity but c(qi, ki) exhibits constant returns to scale in qi and ki, i ∈ {I, 1, ..., N}. This cost
function is more general than most cost functions used in models of vertical integration since
it allows a firm to vary its quantity for given capacity. In particular, it is more general than
the widely used fixed proportions cost function which allows a firm to produce only a maximal
number of output units given its number of inputs units.
Capacity is supplied competitively with an inverse supply function of R(K), with R′(K) > 0
and K ≡ kI +
∑N
j=1 kj . Firm I’s initial capacity endowment, i.e. its ex ante degree of vertical
5In Section 6.4 we briefly discuss the consequences of more than one firm being vertically integrated.
6This type of cost function was introduced by Perry (1978) and used e.g. by Perry and Porter (1985),
Riordan (1998) and Hendricks and McAfee (2009). For an interpretation of the cost function see Perry (1978)
and Riordan (1998).
7One can also interpret γ as a quality advantage in the integrated firm’s product.
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integration, is denoted by k ≥ 0.
The timing of the game is as follows: In the first stage, the capacity stage, all firms i
choose simultaneously their level of capacity ki. The ex ante degree of vertical integration k
is exogenously given and common knowledge. Firm I buys kI − k at the market price R(K).
Thus, the profit function of firm I at the capacity stage is given by
ΠI(qI , kI) = P (Q)qI − kIC
(
qI
kI
)
+ γqI − (kI − k)R (K) ,
and the one of a non-integrated firm j is Πj(qj , kj) = P (Q)qj − kjC (qj/kj) − kjR (K). As in
Riordan (1998), this implies that firm I has the opportunity to sell undesired capacity to an
outside market, which occurs if kI < k. In the second stage, the quantity stage, all firms simul-
taneously choose their quantities after having observed all capacity levels k = (kI , k1, .., kN ).
The aggregate quantity Q determines the market clearing price P (Q) and payoffs are real-
ized. We focus on symmetric subgame perfect equilibria, where symmetry means that the
non-integrated firms play the same strategies.
To ensure interior solutions and a unique equilibrium, we make some shape assumptions on
the demand, supply and cost function. We suppose that limQ→∞ P (Q) ≤ 0, that P
′′(Q) is not
too positive and that P ′′′(Q), C ′′′(qi/ki) and R
′′(K) are not too negative. These assumptions,
which are similar to the ones imposed by Riordan (1998), are relatively mild and guarantee
that the second-order conditions are fulfilled. They are standard in two-stage games where
firms have market power upstream and downstream.8
3 Equilibrium
We solve the game by backward induction.
3.1 The Quantity Stage (Stage 2)
At the quantity stage, k is already determined. Since k has a direct effect only on kI but not
on qI , the first-order condition for a profit maximum for each firm i does not depend directly
on k. So, the first-order condition for a non-integrated firm j ∈ {1, ..., N} in the subgame of
the quantity stage is given by9
P (Q) + P ′(Q)qj = C
′
j, (1)
8Linear demand and supply functions and quadratic cost functions are obviously sufficient for these assump-
tions to be satisfied. While it is possible to spell out more general conditions on these functions, these more
general conditions are rather complex and obscure.
9To shorten notation, in the following we abbreviate P (Q) by P , C (qj/kj) by Cj and R(K) by R. We do so
also for all derivatives.
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while the first-order condition for firm I is given by
P (Q) + P ′(Q)qI = C
′
I − γ. (2)
It is easy to see that the second-order conditions are satisfied given that P ′′ is not too pos-
itive, which we assumed above. Our assumptions also imply that firm i’s reaction function
has a negative slope greater than −1. Therefore, every quantity-stage subgame has a unique
equilibrium.
We denote by Q∗(k) the aggregate equilibrium quantity given any vector of capacities k,
and by q∗i (k) the corresponding equilibrium quantity of firm i. The first-order conditions (1)
and (2) imply that q∗i (kˆi,k−i) > q
∗
i (ki,k−i) if and only if kˆi > ki, where k−i is the capacity
vector of all firms other than i. That is, a firm’s optimal quantity increases in its capacity
independently of the type of the firm.10 We then get the following lemma:
Lemma 1
q∗i (k)
ki
decreases in ki ∀i ∈ {I, 1, ..., N}.
The same result obtains in Riordan (1998). As observed above, a firm with a larger capacity
produces a larger quantity. But because it produces more inframarginal units, it benefits more
from a price increase. Therefore, it has an incentive to lower its quantity relative to capacity,
i.e. it utilizes its capacity to a smaller extent.
From the first-order conditions we get the following intuitive lemma.
Lemma 2
dq∗i (k)
dki
> 0 and
dq∗i (k)
dkj
< 0 for all i 6= j, i, j ∈ {I, 1, ..., N}. (3)
Therefore, all own effects are positive and all cross effects are negative.
3.2 The Capacity Stage (Stage 1)
We now move on to the first stage of the game, the capacity choice game.
Using the envelope theorem we get that the first-order condition of a non-integrated firm j
in the capacity stage is given by
∂Πj
∂kj
= P ′
dQ∗−j
dkj
q∗j − Cj +C
′
j
q∗j
kj
−R− kjR
′ = 0, (4)
10To see this, suppose to the contrary that kˆi > ki but q
∗
i (kˆi,k−i) ≤ q
∗
i (ki,k−i). But then the right-hand
side of (1), respectively (2), is strictly smaller for kˆi than for ki because Ci is convex in qi and decreasing
in ki while the left-hand side is (weakly) larger for kˆi than for ki, which is a contradiction. Conversely, if
q∗i (kˆi,k−i) > q
∗
i (ki,k−i), the left hand-side of (1), respectively (2), is smaller than the right-hand side. Since Ci
is convex, kˆi must be bigger than ki.
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where Q∗−j is the equilibrium quantity of all firms but firm j. The first-order condition of the
integrated firm I is given by
∂ΠI
∂kI
= P ′
dQ∗−I
dkI
q∗I −CI +C
′
I
q∗I
kI
−R− (kI − k)R
′ = 0. (5)
Showing that an equilibrium exists and, if it does, is unique is more involved in the capacity
stage than in the quantity stage. This is the case because now a change in firm i’s capacity
has an effect on the equilibrium quantity of each firm in the second stage. This must be taken
into account when considering the capacity reaction function of every firm other than i. Thus,
the expression for the reaction function is more complicated than in a standard single stage
game.11 Nevertheless, using arguments based on Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) the next lemma
establishes that an equilibrium exists and is indeed unique.
Lemma 3 There exists a unique equilibrium in the capacity stage. In this equilibrium, k∗I and
k∗j ∀j ∈ {1, ..., N} are determined by (4) and (5).
From the two first-order conditions we can now derive the following lemma:
Lemma 4
dk∗I
dk
> 0 and
dk∗j
dk
< 0 ∀j ∈ {1, ..., N}.
This result is intuitive. If k increases, firm I owns more capacity units. Thus, the number
of inframarginal units for which it has to pay the capacity price R on the upstream market
decreases. As a consequence, firm I finds it optimal to increase its overall amount of capacity.
On the other hand, k does not directly influence the optimal capacity of the non-integrated
firms. However, since k∗I rises, the price for capacity increases, and so it is optimal for each
non-integrated firm to acquire less capacity. Thus, capacities are strategic substitutes.
It follows immediately from Lemma 4 and equations (1) and (2) that k∗I > k
∗
j if either
k > 0 or γ > 0 or both. Thus, if firm I is vertically integrated to some extent or has a cost
advantage or both, its equilibrium capacity is larger than the one of the non-integrated firms.
From Lemma 1 we know that this implies that its capacity utilization q∗I/k
∗
I is lower than for
the non-integrated firms if γ is small.12
11Moreover, the game is not an aggregator game since the reaction of a non-integrated firm is different if firm
I changes its capacity than if a non-integrated firm changes its capacity because this has different effects on the
overall quantity produced in the second stage.
12This replicates the finding of Riordan (1998) who shows that the capacity utilization of the dominant firm
is smaller than the one of fringe firms provided that the cost advantage is not too large.
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4 Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration
In this section we analyze whether vertical integration is pro - or anticompetitive, i.e. whether
a change in k increases or decreases the aggregate equilibrium quantity supplied in the down-
stream market. From above it follows that an increase in k has a direct positive effect on kI
and via that an indirect negative effect on all kj .
13 This in turn leads to an increase in qI and
to a decrease in all qj. Thus, dQ/dk > 0 if and only if
dQ
dk
=
(
dqI
dkI
+N
dqj
dkI
)
dkI
dk
+N
(
dqI
dkj
+
dqj
dkj
+ (N − 1)
dqi
dkj
)
dkj
dk
> 0
or equivalently (
dkj
dk
)
(
dkI
dk
) > − dqIdkI +N dqjdkI
N
(
dqI
dkj
+
dqj
dkj
+ (N − 1) dqi
dkj
) . (6)
The left-hand side of (6) expresses the relative change of a non-integrated firm’s capacity with
k to the change in the integrated firm’s capacity. We know from Lemma 4 that this relative
change is negative. The right-hand side gives a benchmark against which to compare this term.
The inequality says that if the relative change is small enough in absolute terms, then vertical
integration is procompetitive. Intuitively, if kj does not fall by too large an extent after firm
I becomes more integrated, the positive effect resulting from the increase in qI dominates the
negative effect that stems from the decrease in qj of all non-integrated firms.
Inserting the respective derivatives (derived in the proof of Lemma 2) in the term on the
right-hand side of (6) and simplifying yields(
dkj
dk
)
(
dkI
dk
) > − C ′′I qIkI (C ′′j − kjP ′)
NC ′′j
qj
kj
(C ′′I − kIP
′)
. (7)
To gain some intuition for this formula suppose that both k and γ are zero. In this case all N+1
firms are the same and we have that qI = qj, kI = kj and thus C
′′
I = C
′′
j . As a consequence, the
right-hand side of (7) simplifies to −1/N : At k = 0 and γ = 0, all firms’ capacity utilization
is the same. Thus, to keep overall output constant, the aggregate capacity reduction of the
non-integrated firms must be the same as the increase in the capacity of firm I. But since all
N non-integrated firms are symmetric, this is the case if each of them lowers its capacity by
1/N of the increase in the integrated firm’s capacity.
13To simplify notation here and in what follows we omit the superscript ∗ on equilibrium quantities and
capacities.
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Suppose now that γ = 0 but k > 0. From the above lemmas we know that in this case
kI > kj , qI/kI < qj/kj and thus C
′′
I < C
′′
j . Then, the right-hand side of (7) is in absolute value
smaller than 1/N . The reason is that in this case the integrated firm uses its capacity less
efficiently than a non-integrated firm. As a consequence, if all non-integrated firms reduced
their capacity in sum by the same amount as the capacity increase of the integrated firm,
overall output would fall since capacity is shifted to the less efficient firm. Thus, to keep
output constant the reduction has to be smaller and overall capacity must rise.
To characterize how vertical integration changes overall output, we begin with the case
where k is small.
Proposition 1 For any finite N there exists a k∗ > 0, such that for all k < k∗ vertical
integration is procompetitive at the margin.
If the ex ante degree of vertical integration is small enough, further integration is procom-
petitive at the margin. If k is small, firm I is more efficient than a non-integrated one or, in
case γ is small, only slightly less efficient. But the reaction of the non-integrated firms to an
increase in k, i.e. the fall in Nkj , is in sum always smaller than the increase in kI . Thus, the
aggregate capacity that is used increases and overall output rises.
Next we look at the opposite case where k is so high that the resulting k∗I in equilibrium
is large enough to induce k∗j = 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., N}. The following definition is useful. We
define k¯ as the ex ante degree of vertical integration at which k∗j = 0 and therefore q
∗
j = 0, i.e.
if k = k¯, only the integrated is active and the market is monopolized.14
Proposition 2 For any finite N there either exists a k∗∗ < k¯, such that vertical integration
is anticompetitive at the margin for all k > k∗∗, or it is procompetitive at the margin for all k
close to k¯.
This result implies that even if rival firms are completely foreclosed by the integrated firm,
this is not necessarily detrimental to consumer welfare. This is the case because our model
does explicitly take into account efficiency gains in production beyond pure avoidance of double
marginalization. If a firm has to acquire a very large amount of capacity, so that its competitors
14Such a k¯ necessarily exists since from Lemma 4 we know that dkI/dk > 0 and dkj/dk < 0. In addition,
variable production costs c(qj , kj) are decreasing in kj since C
′′(qj/kj) > 0. Thus, both production and capacity
costs are increasing for a non-integrated firm j, while revenue is decreasing because qj is decreasing and qI is
increasing. So if k and therewith kI is large enough, j’s costs are too high relative to P (Q), and so it is optimal
for firm j to stop producing.
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stop producing, its production costs are so low that it may produce a quantity that is larger
than the oligopoly quantity.
The question arises whether the thresholds identified in Propositions 1 and 2 coincide.
Put differently, is it possible to show that there is a unique k∗ = k∗∗ in case this threshold
exists or that dQ/dk > 0 for all k ≤ k¯?15 Since the expressions that are involved in the
calculations are rather complicated and unwieldy, it is not possible to show uniqueness in
general. However, we can show that the threshold, provided it exists, is indeed unique for two
important subclasses of the general specification: The first class consists of models where R′
is dominating the derivatives of the other functions.16 The second class is the widely used
linear-quadratic specification, i.e. the demand and supply functions are linear and the cost
function is quadratic. The functions can then be written as P (Q) = α− βQ, R (K) = δK and
C(qi/ki) =
c
2
(
qi
ki
)2
∀i ∈ {I, 1, ..., N},
where α, β, c and δ are positive constants. The integrated firm still has a marginal cost advan-
tage γ ≥ 0.
Proposition 3 Suppose either that (i) R′ is dominating all other derivatives in absolute values
or that (ii) the model is linear-quadratic. Then, for any finite N there either exists a unique
k∗ ∈ (0, k¯), such that vertical integration is procompetitive at the margin for all k < k∗ and
anticompetitive at the margin for all k > k∗, or vertical integration is always procompetitive.
A few comments are in order. The intuition for case (i) of the proposition is that if R′
is large compared to all other derivatives, the capacity reaction of a non-integrated firm to a
change in kI , and therefore also to a change in k, is independent of the value of k. Therefore,
(dkj/dk)/(dkI/dk) stays constant as k varies. But the right-hand side of (7) is in absolute
terms constantly decreasing as k rises. This is the case because firm I utilizes its capacity less
and less as k increases. Thus, there is at most one point of intersection between the left- and
the right-hand side of (7). Case (ii) of the proposition is important because it shows that the
threshold is unique (given that it exists) in the general linear-quadratic specification used in
many industrial organization models. In addition, this indicates that the threshold is unique
15This would imply that the left- and the right-hand side of (7) cross either exactly once or never.
16A steeply increasing supply curve can be observed in many high technological industries. For example,
dedicated fiber-optic cables or several semiconductor devices like customized integrated circuits that are produced
in specialized plants exhibit large production costs that are steeply increasing once a plant produces close to its
capacity limit.
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also for specifications that are close to the linear-quadratic one and suggests that the threshold
is likely to be unique even more generally.
Since our result that the efficiency gains of vertical integration are often larger than the
foreclosure effects differ from the one of the dominant firm model, it is of interest to understand
the economic reason behind this. In the dominant firm model vertical integration leads to
foreclosure of fringe firms. As a consequence, some of them exit the market. But since fringe
firms have no market power, they have no incentive to restrict their quantity. Therefore, they
utilize their capacity efficiently. In contrast, under downstream oligopoly the competitors of
the integrated firm also exert market power and restrict their output to keep the final good
price high. Thus, as a consequence of the foreclosure through vertical integration, a rival firm
lowers its quantity to a smaller extent than the exit of a fringe firm reduces the final output
in the dominant firm model. Moreover, as vertical integration increases, each rival firm in the
oligopoly case buys a smaller amount of capacity, and so its capacity utilization increases. As
a result, in the dominant firm model the output contraction of fringe firms after foreclosure is
larger than the reaction of rival firms under oligopoly.
Change in the Number of Firms We now consider the effect of a change in the number
of firms on the competitive effects of vertical integration. First, we look at the general model
when the number of downstream firms becomes large. This is of interest from a theoretical
perspective because this limit corresponds to the model Riordan (1998) analyzes. Second,
understanding how the competitive effects of vertical integration depend on the competitive
structure of the industry is particularly relevant for antitrust policy implications.
Proposition 4 If N →∞, then vertical integration is anticompetitive for all 0 ≤ k ≤ k¯.
So if the downstream market becomes perfectly competitive, vertical integration is always
anticompetitive. Intuitively, the aggregate reaction of the non-integrated firms to an increase
in k is the larger, the more firms are in the market. Therefore, the aggregate capacity reduction
and, hence, the quantity reduction of the non-integrated firms increases in their number. As
N goes to infinity this effect dominates any cost advantage of the integrated firm. Thus in
the limit, as the market power of the non-integrated firms vanishes, we obtain the result of
Riordan (1998). As the integrated firm has no first-mover advantage in our model but has
one in Riordan’s, Proposition 4 also shows that his strong result stems genuinely from the
13
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Figure 1: The threshold values k∗(N, γ) for γ = 0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15 and γ = 0.2 in the linear-
quadratic model.
dominant firm’s market power rather than being an artefact of the first-mover advantage it has
by assumption.
Let us now look at changes in N given that it is finite. We restrict our attention to the
linear-quadratic case because, unfortunately, such a comparative static analysis is not possible
in the model with general functions. In the linear-quadratic case introduced above, we can solve
for the equilibrium capacities and quantities if we consider explicit numbers for the parameters
α, β, c, δ and γ.
Using numerical computations we first analyze how the threshold k∗ changes with N , pro-
vided k∗ < k¯. Figure 1 shows how k∗ depends on N for five different values of γ.17 It is
evident from the downward sloping shape of the graphs that vertical integration is more likely
to become anticompetitive as N increases. We have analyzed many variations of the model
with different slopes of the demand function, the variable cost function and the capacity supply
function. All results most strongly support the notion that in the linear-quadratic model k∗
decreases in N . Since k∗ decreases in N , these results also show that Riordan’s (1998) dom-
inant firm model becomes an increasingly better approximation as the downstream industry
17All simulations were done in Python and are available upon request. In Figure 1 we set the parameters α,
β, c and δ equal to one.
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becomes more and more competitive.
Surprisingly, Figure 1 also reveals that vertical integration is procompetitive for a larger
set of k the larger is γ because increases in γ result in upward shifts of k∗.18 The intuition is
that the integrated firm utilizes its capacity to a larger degree if its cost advantage is bigger.
Therefore, capacity is shifted to the more efficient firm which makes vertical integration more
likely to be procompetitive.
Figure 1 also illustrates that vertical integration even to monopoly can be procompetitive.
For example, for γ = 0.2 vertical integration is procompetitive at the margin for any k, pro-
vided N ≤ 4. This is the case because for small N there exists no k∗ < k¯ above which vertical
integration reduces aggregate quantity. Notice that vertical integration to monopoly is pro-
competitive for a larger range of N the larger is γ. Interestingly, and to some extent ironically,
these results show that vertical integration is more likely to be anticompetitive exactly when
the industry is more competitive (i.e. when N is large). As we will discuss in Section 6.1
this is at odds with the common belief that foreclosure effects are present especially in con-
centrated markets but in line with the empirical observation that in these markets efficiency
effects dominate foreclosure effects.
5 Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration
So far we have only looked at the competitive effects of vertical integration, i.e if vertical
integration leads to an increase in overall quantity and thereby to an increase in consumer
surplus. Since competition authorities both in Europe and in the U.S. base their decisions
mainly on the effects on consumer surplus, this analysis is most relevant for competition policy.
Yet, it is of equal importance to analyze the implications of vertical integration on social welfare,
which can be expressed as
W =
Q∫
0
P (x)dx− kIC
(
qI
kI
)
+ γqI −NkjC
(
qj
kj
)
−
K∫
0
R(y)dy.
The first term is the consumer surplus, the second and third term are the variable cost of the
integrated firm while the fourth term represents the variable cost of all non-integrated firms.
18Each curve k∗(N, γ) also exhibits a flat segment initially. This flat part corresponds to the smallest value
of k such that the non-integrated competitors stop production (in our notation k¯), at which we stopped our
simulations. For any k > k¯, vertical integration is procompetitive simply because it reduces the cost of the only
active firm. The fact that the curves k∗(N, γ) intersect for small values of N does therefore not conflict with the
statement that vertical integration is procompetitive for a larger set of k the larger γ.
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The last term is the opportunity cost of capacity. Differentiating this expression with respect
to k (and dropping arguments) yields that welfare is increasing in k if and only if
dW
dk
= P
dQ
dk
−NCj
dkj
dk
−NkjC
′
j
(
1
kj
dqj
dk
−
qj
k2j
dkj
dk
)
− (8)
−CI
dkI
dk
− kIC
′
I
(
1
kI
dqI
dk
−
qI
k2I
dkI
dk
)
+ γ
dqI
dk
−R
dK
dk
> 0.
Using the first-order conditions from the quantity and the capacity stage for all firms, we
can rewrite the above expression to get
dkj
dk
dkI
dk
> −
−P ′
(
qI
dQ
dkI
+ qj
dQ−I
dkI
)
+R′(kI − k)
N
[
−P ′
(
qj
dQ
dkj
+ (N − 1)qj
dqi
dkj
+ qI
dqI
dkj
)
+R′kj
] . (9)
This inequality has a similar structure as (6). The left-hand side is the equilibrium ratio of
the reaction of kj in response to a change in k to the reaction of kI . It is the same in both
equations. The right-hand side is different because when considering social welfare we have to
take into account that the cost structure and therefore the absolute value of the overall costs
changes as k varies. Nevertheless, the result we obtain is similar to the one of the last section.
Proposition 5 For any finite N there exists a k∗W > 0 such that for all k < k
∗
W vertical
integration is welfare increasing at the margin. There also either exists a k∗∗W < k¯ such that for
all k > k∗∗W vertical integration is welfare decreasing at the margin, or it is welfare increasing
at the margin for any k close to k¯.
The intuition behind this result is similar to the ones for Propositions 1 and 2. If the ex ante
degree of vertical integration is low, further vertical integration increases final output and has
the effect of shifting production to the more efficient firm. Therefore, it is welfare increasing.
On the other hand, if k is already very large, the overall quantity may decrease and, in addition,
the less efficient firm produces more, which rises production costs even for a given quantity.
As in the last section, the question arises under which conditions there is a unique threshold
(given that it exists). We can show a result that is akin to the one of Proposition 3.
Proposition 6 Suppose either that (i) R′ is dominating all other derivatives in absolute values
or that (ii) the model is linear-quadratic. Then, for any finite N there either exists a unique
k∗W ∈ (0, k¯) such that vertical integration is welfare enhancing at the margin for all k < k
∗
W
and welfare reducing at the margin for all k > k∗W , or vertical integration is always welfare
enhancing.
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The analysis so far resembles the one of the previous section. However, the threshold values
of k obtained in the welfare analysis are different from the ones obtained for consumer surplus
because, as mentioned, the variable costs of production and the opportunity costs of capacity
change with an increase in k. Since the rise in kI caused by an increase in k is larger than the
fall in aggregate capacity of non-integrated firms, K is increasing in k and so capacity costs
are increasing. If, in addition, firm I utilizes its capacity less efficiently than a non-integrated
firm, we know that overall production costs must increase. In this case the set of k for which
vertical integration is welfare enhancing is smaller than the one for which it is procompetitive.
The next proposition confirms that for the linear-quadratic specification such a case can indeed
occur.
Proposition 7 In the linear-quadratic case, there either exists a unique γˆ such that k∗W < k
∗
for all γ < γˆ and k∗W > k
∗ for all γ > γˆ, or k∗W < k
∗ for all γ.
This result implies that if the cost advantage of the integrated firm is small and the ex
ante degree of integration is between k∗W and k
∗, vertical integration benefits consumers but
lowers social welfare. The intuition is that for small γ, firm I is always less efficient than a non-
integrated firm at k∗. As a consequence, vertical integration increases overall production costs
at k∗, where aggregate quantity stays constant. Thus, even if aggregate quantity increases
slightly, the effect of increased production costs dominates and welfare falls. The result is
interesting since it seems natural to conjecture that procompetitive vertical integration also
improves welfare because firms’ profits should rise as the market becomes more concentrated.
However, what is missing in this reasoning is that vertical integration shifts production costs
between firms. Proposition 7 shows that this effect can be so large that procompetitive but
welfare reducing mergers are possible.
On the other hand, if the cost advantage of the integrated firm is sufficiently large, vertical
integration may shift production to the more efficient firm. In this case, anticompetitive but
welfare enhancing mergers occur if k ∈ (k∗, k∗W ). Although overall quantity decreases, this
smaller quantity is now produced more efficiently. This result is also consistent with Riordan’s
(1998) finding that welfare increasing but anticompetitive vertical integration is possible if the
cost advantage of the dominant firm is large. However, procompetitive but welfare reducing
mergers cannot occur in the dominant firm model.
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6 Discussion
6.1 Empirical Evidence
The main results of our analysis are that the efficiency gains from vertical integration are
larger than the foreclosure effects for a fairly wide array of circumstances, and that vertical
integration is more likely to be anticompetitive if the industry is less concentrated. We now
briefly argue that our results are consistent with the recent empirical studies by Hortac¸su and
Syverson (2007) and Lafontaine and Slade (2007).
Hortac¸su and Syverson (2007) provide a study of the cement and ready-mixed concrete
industries during the years 1963 to 1997. In this time period the extent of vertical integration
between both industries increased, especially between 1982 and 1992 when the fraction of
vertically integrated cement plants rose from 32.5% to 49.5%. Hortac¸su and Syverson (2007)
find little support for anticompetitive effects of vertical integration. Instead, vertical mergers
between firms in the above industries have led to a rise in output and to a fall in the final
good price. The rise in output stems from the expansion of more productive integrated firms
and was to the detriment of smaller, less efficient producers. These results are in line with
our findings. In addition, Hortac¸su and Syverson (2007) show, after controlling for firm size
and productivity impacts, that efficiency of a firm cannot be explained by vertical integration.
Instead, firms that are larger and more efficient at the outset tend to be vertically integrated,
and increases in integration reflect the expansion of these more efficient producers. This is
also consistent with our finding that the firm with a cost advantage increases its output after
integration but integration itself makes it utilize its capacity less.19
Lafontaine and Slade (2007) present a comprehensive survey of empirical studies on vertical
integration. The industries in these studies include several different sectors ranging from the
steel industry, where a steel producer acquires an iron ore mine, to the gasoline industry, where
some refiners and stations are integrated, while others are not.20 Lafontaine and Slade (2007)
observe that ”[a]uthors have looked for detrimental effects from vertical mergers mostly in
concentrated markets. [...] However, even though authors typically choose markets where they
expect to find evidence for exclusion, half of the studies find no sign of it. And where they find
19Cooper, Froeb, O’Brien and Vita (2005) as well as Lafontaine and Slade (2007) in their extensive reviews of
empirical studies on vertical integration also find that in the vast majority of cases vertical mergers are beneficial
to consumers. Although foreclosure effects are present in some cases, the net effect appears to be positive because
efficiency gains dominate.
20See Mullin and Mullin (1997) for an in-depth study of the steel industry and e.g. Barron and Umbeck (1984)
or Blass and Carlton (2001) for studies of the gasoline industry.
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evidence of exclusion or foreclosure, they also at times document efficiencies that arise from the
same merger” (p. 671). Lafontaine and Slade (2007, p. 680) draw the conclusion that “[e]ven
in industries that are highly concentrated so that horizontal considerations assume substantial
importance, the net effect of vertical integration appears to be positive in many instances”.
This evidence and the conclusion are fully consistent with the predictions of our model. In
addition, our model suggests that detrimental effects from vertical integration are more likely
to be found exactly when markets are less concentrated. Here, the foreclosure effect is likely
to dominate the efficiency effect.
6.2 Policy Implications
Let us now discuss some policy implications of our analysis. As a general theme, our results
suggest a relatively permissive approach to vertical integration since we find that although the
foreclosure effect on non-integrated firms is present, the efficiency gains are ’usually’ larger.21
An important question is if our model permits conclusions about the welfare effects of
vertical integration that are based on observable market conditions. For example, a nice feature
of Riordan’s (1998) dominant firm model is that it establishes an indicator about the welfare
effects of vertical integration that holds for general functions and is based on the ratio of input
to output market shares. Though such general conclusions cannot be drawn in the present
paper, it is nonetheless possible to calculate in an easy way the critical input or output market
share of the integrated firm from the thresholds k∗ and k∗W . Beyond these critical market shares
further vertical integration reduces consumer surplus and social welfare. This is particularly
useful if data on market shares are easier to obtain than assessing the ex ante degree of vertical
integration. For the linear-quadratic model Figure 2 illustrates this critical output market
share of the integrated firm, denoted by s∗ for different values of γ and N . As expected, these
graphs closely resemble the results obtained above for the threshold value of the ex ante degree
of integration. We also find for several parameter constellations that the critical input market
share is almost identical to the output market share. Qualitatively, these results also hold for
the critical market shares beyond which further vertical integration reduces social welfare.
Our analysis thus provides a rationale for the EU non-horizontal merger guidelines issued in
2007 which recognize safe harbors expressed as market shares of 30% both in the input and in
21This result is line with the conclusions by Lafontaine and Slade (2007) and Church (2008) who argue that
the burden of proof that vertical integration is harmful should be placed on the competition authorities.
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Figure 2: The critical output market share of the integrated firm s∗(N, γ) for γ = 0, 0.05 and
γ = 0.1 in the linear-quadratic model.
output market below which no investigation of vertical integration takes place.22 However, our
results also indicate that these thresholds decrease with the number of firms in the industry.
The more competitors there are, the lower is the threshold above which vertical integration is
anticompetitive. Overall, this suggests that it is reasonable to impose similar thresholds for
input and output market shares but it may be useful to make them contingent on the number
of firms in the industry.
6.3 Discrete Vertical Integration
Throughout the paper, we have treated vertical integration as a continuous variable. This is
done for analytical tractability. In reality, however, vertical integration is rarely a continuous
process. Instead, if a downstream firm merges with an upstream firm, it normally acquires a
non-negligible fraction of the intermediate good market. Translated into our model this means
that k increases in a discrete step. This is likely to shift the balance even more in favor of a
more permissive approach to vertical integration. The reason is that the first units of vertical
integration up to some threshold are always procompetitive. Suppose now that a firm is not
or only slightly integrated at the outset. If this firm acquires an upstream firm even to such
22See European Union, Commission Notice, Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers, p.5;
available at: non-horizontal http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/nonhorizontalguidelines.pdf.
an extent that the marginal unit of integration is anticompetitive, the merger as a whole may
still be procompetitive because the first units are procompetitive. These units dominate if the
threshold is not too small, and the merger not too large. So even if a firm can only merge with
a significant part of the upstream industry, it seems plausible that the overall effect of vertical
integration should result in an increase of final output.
6.4 Several Vertically Integrated Firms
In our analysis we have restricted attention to the case in which only one firm has the possibility
to vertically integrate. Yet, since in the oligopoly model all firms have market power, it is
conceivable that there is more than one integrated firm. Due to the complexity of the model
it is impossible to treat this case analytically. However, numerical calculations confirm that all
of our insights hold in this case as well. In fact, if there is a second integrated firm, say firm I2,
the threshold for k below which vertical integration of firm I is procompetitive is even larger.
The reason is that the capacity reduction of firm I2 as a reaction to the integration of firm I
is smaller than the one of the non-integrated firms. This is the case because firm I2 now owns
some capacity units itself and is therefore less affected by an increase in the capacity price.
We can also compare the ex ante degree of vertical integration below which further marginal
integration is procompetitive for the two firms. Here we find that the one of firm I, i.e. the firm
with the cost advantage, is larger. The intuition is similar to the model with one integrated
firm, namely that a cost advantage induces firm I to utilize its capacity more efficiently than
firm I2. In addition, the result that vertical integration is more likely to be procompetitive the
larger is the number of competitors now holds for both integrated firms.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we show that vertical integration with downstream oligopoly and an increasing
upstream supply curve is procompetitive under fairly wide circumstances. Whether it is pro-
competitive or anticompetitive depends on the ex ante degree of vertical integration. Only
if this degree is high and the number of downstream competitors relatively large will verti-
cal integration reduce final goods output and increase consumer prices. Otherwise, vertical
integration lowers prices and thus benefits consumers. Nevertheless, this does not necessarily
imply that social welfare increases as well, because final output may be produced less efficiently.
Our analysis allows the determination of critical input and output market shares above which
21
vertical integration is anticompetitive.
We obtained the results in a framework with homogeneous goods in the downstream market.
An interesting direction for further research is how the strength of the efficiency effect and the
foreclosure effect changes when firms produce differentiated goods. In this case, the effect
of vertical integration on the downstream market interaction between firms is smaller. This
indicates that the reduction in quantity of a non-integrated firm is smaller as well. However,
since firms have more market power downstream, it is not obvious how a non-integrated firm
reacts with its capacity choice if the capacity price increases. In general, since downstream
competition is lower than with homogeneous goods, it seems likely that the overall effect is
procompetitive for a large range of parameters as well.
An important challenge for future research is to endogenize the downstream market struc-
ture by allowing firms to enter and exit conditional on the degree of vertical integration. This
might be accomplished by imposing fixed costs of entry and adding an entry stage that precede
the capacity stage in the current model. Since the non-integrated firms can now not only reduce
their capacity but also exit as a reaction to further integration, the range for anticompetitive
vertical integration is likely to become larger. Nevertheless, if the integrating firm is only in-
tegrated to a moderate extent, it seems plausible that the efficiency effect is still dominating,
which would yield similar policy implications as the present analysis. As such an exercise is
most likely to be a difficult one, we leave it for further research.
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A Appendix
To simplify notation, we omit the superscript ∗ on equilibrium quantities and equilibrium
capacities throughout this appendix.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We know that qi(kˆi,k−i) > qi(ki,k−i) if and only if kˆi > ki. But this implies that the left-hand
side of (1), respectively (2), is smaller for kˆi than for ki. As a consequence, the right-hand side
must be smaller as well. Since Ci is convex, it follows that qi(kˆi,k−i)/kˆi < qi(ki,k−i)/ki. The
only if part can be proved by following the steps in the opposite direction. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Let j 6= i, j 6= I and i 6= I. Totally differentiating (1) with respect to kj yields
23
P ′
dQ
dkj
+ P ′
dqj
dkj
+ P ′′qj
dQ
dkj
= −C ′′j
qj
k2j
+ C ′′j
1
kj
dqj
dkj
. (10)
We can write dQ/dkj as dQ/dkj = dqI/dkj+
∑
i6=j dqi/dkj+dqj/dkj , which under the symmetry
assumption that ki = kj for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, becomes
dQ
dkj
=
dqI
dkj
+ (N − 1)
dqi
dkj
+
dqj
dkj
.
Therefore, (10) can be written as an equation that depends on the three variables dqi/dkj ,
dqj/dkj and dqI/dkj , which we wish to determine.
Totally differentiating the first-order condition of firm i, which is analogous to (1), with
respect to kj yields
P ′
dQ
dkj
+ P ′
dqi
dkj
+ P ′′qi
dQ
dkj
= C ′′i
1
ki
dqi
dkj
, (11)
and, analogously, differentiating the first-order condition for I, equation (2), with respect to kj
yields
P ′
dQ
dkj
+ P ′
dqI
dkj
+ P ′′qI
dQ
dkj
= C ′′I
1
kI
dqI
dkj
. (12)
The unique solution to the system of three equations (10), (11) and (12), which are linear in
the three unknowns dqi/dkj , dqj/dkj and dqI/dkj , is
dqI
dkj
=
C ′′j qjkI(P
′ + P ′′qj)
ηkj
< 0 for j 6= I, (13)
dqi
dkj
=
C ′′j qj[(C
′′
I − P
′kj)(P
′ + P ′′qj)]
η(C ′′j − P
′kj)
< 0 for j 6= i (14)
23Notice that the proof holds for any capacities, not only for equilibrium values.
23
and
dqj
dkj
=
C ′′j qj[(P
′)2kjkI(N + 1) + P
′(P ′′kjkI(qI + (N − 1)qj)− 2C
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′′
I kjN)]
ηkj(C ′′j − P
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I kjqj)]
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where η ≡ {(P ′)2(N+2)kIkj+P
′[P ′′kjkI(qI+Nqj)−C
′
Ikj(N+1)−2kIC
′′
j ]+C
′′
IC
′′
j −P
′′(C ′′j qIkI+
C ′′I qjkjN)} > 0. The inequality sign follows from the assumption that P
′′ is negative or not
too positive.
Totally differentiating the first-order conditions of firm I and j with respect to kI yields,
respectively,
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1
kj
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dkI
, (17)
where under symmetry dQ/dkI = dqI/dkI + Ndqj/dkI . Using the last equation to replace
dQ/dkI in (16) and (17) yields a system of two linear equations in the two unknowns dqI/dkI
and dqj/dkI . The solution is
dqj
dkI
=
C ′′I qIkj(P
′′qj + P
′)
ν
< 0 (18)
and
dqI
dkI
= −
C ′′I qI [kj(P
′qj(N + 1) + P
′′Nqj)−C
′′
j ]
ν
> 0, (19)
where ν ≡ kI{(P
′)2kIkj(N + 2) + P
′[P ′′kjkI(qI + Nqj) − C
′′
I kj(N + 1) − 2C
′′
i kI ] + C
′′
IC
′′
j −
P ′′[C ′′j qIkI +C
′′
I qjkjN ]} > 0. Again, the inequality sign follows from P
′′ not being too positive.
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A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Differentiating (4) with respect to kj and (5) with respect to kI yields second-order conditions
of
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In the following we show that (20) is indeed fulfilled when the first-order conditions are satisfied.
The second-order condition for the integrated firm can then be shown to be fulfilled in exactly
the same way.
In Lemma 2 we determined the equilibrium expressions for dqi/dkj , i ∈ {I, 1, ..., N}, that
we need in (20). To determine the sign of ∂2Πj/∂k
2
j we still have to determine d
2qI/dk
2
j and
d2qi/dk
2
j . To do so we again calculate dqI/dkj and dqi/dkj but now explicitly distinguish
between qj and qi and between kj and ki, i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}. This gives us
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=
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Differentiating both formulas with respect to kj , using dqi/dkj , dqj/dkj and dqI/dkj from the
proof of Lemma 2, and inserting the resulting expressions into the second-order condition yields
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)
̺
− 2R′ − kjR
′′,
with
̺ = k2j (C
′′
j − kjP
′)3
[
kIkj(N + 2)(P
′)2+
+
(
kIkj(qI +Nqj)P
′′ − 2kIC
′′
j − (N + 1)kjC
′′
I
)
P ′ −
(
NC ′′I kjqj +C
′′
j kIqI
)
P ′′ +C ′′IC
′′
j
]3
> 0,
where we have used that in equilibrium qi = qj , ki = kj and C
′′
i = C
′′
j .
In this equation κsh = κsh(qj , kj , qI , kI , C
′′
j , C
′′
I , P
′, P ′′, N), s ∈ {1, ..., 9} and h ∈ {1, ..., 7}.
We do not specify the exact expressions for κsh here since they stand for rather complex
expressions consisting of several terms. Yet, the sign of these expressions is easy to determine
24One can easily check that if qi = qj , ki = kj and, therefore, C
′′
i = C
′′
j (which is the case in equilibrium),
these formulas yield (13) and (14).
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in each case and this is the only point of relevance for our purpose. These signs are the following:
For h = {1, 2, 3} κsh ≥ 0, if both s and h are either even or odd and κsh ≤ 0 if one is even and
the other one is odd. κs4, κs5, κs6 ≥ 0 for s even and κs4, κs5, κs6 ≤ 0 for s odd. κs7 > 0 for s
even and κs7 < 0 for s odd. Thus, the numerator in the fraction is positive because P
′′ is not
too positive and P ′′′ and C ′′′ are not too negative. Since R′′ is not too negative as well, we get
that ∂2Πj/∂k
2
j < 0. In exactly the same way we can show that the second-order condition for
firm I is satisfied. Thus, the profit function of each firm is quasiconcave in its own capacity
and we have an interior equilibrium.
We now turn to the question of uniqueness. From Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987) and Vives
(1999) we know that the equilibrium is unique if and only if the Jacobian determinant of minus
the marginal profits is positive. In our case this determinant is given by
|J | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
∂2Πj
∂k2j
−
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
. . . −
∂2Πj
∂kj∂kI
− ∂
2Πi
∂ki∂kj
−∂
2Πi
∂k2i
. . . − ∂
2Πi
∂ki∂kI
...
...
. . .
...
− ∂
2ΠI
∂kI∂kj
− ∂
2ΠI
∂kI∂ki
. . . −∂
2ΠI
∂k2
I
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
, (22)
with i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}. The terms that determine this determinant are given by the second-
order conditions, (20) and (21), and the terms ∂2Πj/(∂kj∂kI), ∂
2Πj/(∂kj∂ki), ∂
2Πi/(∂ki∂kj),
∂2ΠI/(∂kI∂kj) and ∂
2ΠI/(∂kI∂ki). We know that in equilibrium ∂
2Πi/(∂ki∂kj) = ∂
2Πj/(∂kj∂ki)
and ∂2ΠI/(∂kI∂ki) = ∂
2ΠI/(∂kI∂kj) because of symmetry. The remaining terms can be writ-
ten as
∂2Πj
∂kj∂kI
= P ′
dqj
dkI
[
dqI
dkj
+ (N − 1)
dqi
dkj
]
+ P ′qj
[
d2qI
dkjdkI
+ (N − 1)
d2qi
dkjdkI
]
(23)
+ P ′′qj
[
dqI
dkj
+ (N − 1)
dqi
dkj
] [
dqI
dkI
+N
dqj
dkI
]
+ C ′′j
qj
k2j
dqj
dkI
−R′ − kjR
′′,
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
= P ′
dqj
dki
[
dqI
dkj
+ (N − 1)
dqi
dkj
]
+ P ′qj
[
d2qI
dkjdki
+ (N − 2)
d2qk
dkjdki
+
d2qi
dkjdki
]
(24)
+ P ′′qj
[
dqI
dkj
+ (N − 1)
dqi
dkj
] [
dqi
dki
+
dqI
dki
+ (N − 1)
dqj
dki
]
+ C ′′j
qj
k2j
dqj
dki
−R′ − kjR
′′,
∂2ΠI
∂kI∂kj
= P ′
dqI
dkj
N
dqj
dkI
+ P ′qI
[
d2qj
dkjdkI
+ (N − 1)
d2qi
dkjdkI
]
+ (25)
+ P ′′qIN
dqI
dkj
[
dqI
dkI
+N
dqj
dkI
]
+ C ′′I
qI
k2I
dqI
dkI
−R′ − (kI − k)R
′′,
The second derivatives that appear in these expressions can be derived in the same way as
above where we checked that the second-order conditions are satisfied.
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Proceeding in a similar way as Kolstad and Mathiesen (1987), i.e. subtracting the first
column in (22) from the other columns, and then dividing the m-th row by
∂2Πm
∂km∂kj
−
∂2Πm
∂k2m
,
with m ∈ {I, 1, ..., N}, yields
|J | =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−
∂2Πj
∂k2
j
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
−
∂2Πj
∂k2
j
−1 −1 . . . −
−
∂2Πj
∂kj∂kI
+
∂2Πj
∂k2
j
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
−
∂2Πj
∂k2
j
−
∂2Πj
∂ki∂ki
∂2Πi
∂ki∂kj
−
∂2Πi
∂k2
i
1 0 0 . . .−
−
∂2Πi
∂ki∂kI
+
∂2Πi
∂ki∂kj
∂2Πi
∂ki∂kj
−
∂2Πi
∂k2
i
...
...
...
. . .
...
−
∂2ΠI
∂kI∂kj
∂2ΠI
∂kI ∂kj
−
∂2ΠI
∂k2
I
0 0 . . . 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
.
We can then calculate the determinant in a relatively straightforward way. Cumbersome but
otherwise routine manipulations show that this determinant is unambiguously positive and,
therefore, that the equilibrium of the capacity stage is unique. 
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
Differentiating (4) and (5) with respect to k yields
∂2ΠI
∂k2I
dkI
dk
+N
∂2ΠI
∂kI∂kj
dkj
dk
+
∂2ΠI
∂kI∂k
= 0
and
∂2Πj
∂k2j
dkj
dk
+ (N − 1)
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
dki
dk
+
∂2Πj
∂kj∂kI
dkI
dk
= 0.
Using the fact that in equilibrium dki
dk
=
dkj
dk
for i, j 6= I we get
dkj
dk
=
∂2Πj
∂kj∂kI
∂2ΠI
∂kI∂k
∂2Πj
∂k2j
∂2ΠI
∂k2
I
+ (N − 1)
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
∂2ΠI
∂k2
I
−N
∂2Πj
∂kj∂kI
∂2ΠI
∂kI∂kj
(26)
and
dkI
dk
= −
∂2ΠI
∂kI∂k
(
∂2Πj
∂k2j
+ (N − 1)
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
)
∂2Πj
∂k2j
∂2ΠI
∂k2
I
+ (N − 1)
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
∂2ΠI
∂k2
I
−N
∂2Πj
∂kj∂kI
∂2ΠI
∂kI∂kj
. (27)
The terms that appear in these expressions are given by (20), (21), (23), (24), (25) and by
∂2ΠI
∂kI∂k
= R′ > 0.
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Tedious but routine calculations then show that all terms in (23), (24) and (25) have a
negative sign. Thus, the numerators of the fractions on the right-hand side of (26) and (27)
are both negative. The denominator in these fractions is the same in both equations. It is easy
to show that |∂2Πj/∂k
2
j | > |∂
2Πj/(∂kj∂ki)| which implies that
∂2Πj
∂k2j
∂2ΠI
∂k2I
>
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
∂2ΠI
∂k2I
.
In addition one can also easily show |∂2ΠI/∂k
2
I | > |∂
2ΠI/(∂kI∂kj)| and that
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
∂2ΠI
∂k2I
>
∂2Πj
∂kj∂kI
∂2ΠI
∂kI∂kj
.
This implies that the denominator is positive. As a consequence, we get that dkj/dk < 0 and
dkI/dk > 0. 
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1
We start with the right-hand side of equation (7), i.e.
−
C ′′I
qI
kI
(C ′′j − kjP
′)
NC ′′j
qj
kj
(C ′′I − kIP
′)
.
Suppose first that γ = 0. As mentioned above, if k = 0, we have kI = kj , qI = qj, and C
′′
I = C
′′
j .
Therefore, the right-hand side of (7) simplifies to −1/N.
We now turn to the left-hand side of equation (7). From (26) and (27) we obtain that(
dkj
dk
)
(
dkI
dk
) = − ∂
2Πj
∂kj∂kI
∂2Πj
∂k2j
+ (N − 1)
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
.
At γ = 0 and k = 0, we know that there is no difference between firm I and any of the
non-integrated firms. This implies that ∂2Πj/(∂kj∂ki) = ∂
2Πj/(∂kj∂kI). To determine if
(dkj/dk) / (dkI/dk) is bigger or smaller than −1/N at γ = 0 and k = 0, it remains to compare
∂2Πj/∂k
2
j with ∂
2Πj/(∂kj∂kI). This yields
∂2Πj
∂k2j
−
∂2Πj
∂kj∂kI
= −
q2jP
′ξ
k2j (C
′′
j − (2 +N)kjP
′ − (1 +N)kjqjP ′′)(C
′′
j − P
′kj)3
,
where
ξ = k2j
(
qjC
′′′
j N + kjC
′′
j (3N + 2)
)
(P ′)3+
+
(
qjk
2
j (kj(1 + 3N)C
′′
j + qjC
′′′
j N)P
′′ − kjC
′′
j (3kj(N + 2)C
′′
j + qjC
′′′
j )
)
(P ′)2+
+
(
−qjkjC
′′
j (kjC
′′
j (3N + 4) + qjC
′′′
j )P
′′ + 5(C ′′j )
3kj
)
P ′ − (C ′′′j )
3(C ′′j − 3qjP
′′kj) < 0.
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But since the denominator is positive and P ′ and ξ are negative, we get
∂2Πj
∂k2j
−
∂2Πj
∂kj∂kI
< 0,
i.e. ∂2Πj/∂k
2
j is larger in absolute terms than ∂
2Πj/(∂kj∂kI). As a consequence, (dkj/dk) / (dkI/dk) >
−1/N . Thus, at γ = 0 and k = 0 vertical integration is procompetitive at the margin.
We now turn to γ > 0. From (4) and (5) we know that if qI = qj, we have kI = kj at k = 0.
But since γ > 0, at kI = kj we in fact get qI > qj. From (4) and (5) this in turn implies that
kI > kj . But one can show that nevertheless qI/kI > qj/kj because qI > qj is a first-order
effect. Thus, at k = 0 and γ > 0, firm I utilizes capacity more efficiently. This implies that a
shift in capacity to firm I is also procompetitive for γ > 0. By continuity it follows that vertical
integration is also procompetitive at the margin for all k below a certain, positive threshold
denoted by k∗. 
A.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Let k = k¯, so that kj = 0 for all j ∈ {1, ..., N}. We first have to determine qj/kj in this case.
Because Cj is strictly convex, C
′
j is invertible and equation (1) can be written as
qj = kj
(
C ′j
)−1 (
P (Q) + P ′(Q)qj
)
. (28)
It follows directly from (28) that if kj = 0 we also have qj = 0.
Observe that the inverse (C ′j)
−1(.) is strictly increasing and that it is zero if and only if its
argument is zero. By using the rule of L’Hoˆpital we get that
qj
kj
=
(
C ′j
)−1
(P (qI)) > 0, ∀j ∈ {1, ..., N}
if qj = 0 and kj = 0. To simplify notation in the following we denote (C
′
j)
−1(P (qI)) ≡ ρ.
We now turn to equation (7). The right-hand side of (7) in the case of k = k¯ can then be
written as
−
C ′′I
qI
kI
ρ(C ′′I − kIP
′)N
.
On the other hand, the left-hand side of (7) in case of qj = kj = 0 can be calculated from (26)
and (27). We obtain that
dkj
dk
dkI
dk
= −
C ′′I P
′ρ qI
kI
+ σ
(N + 1)
(
ρ2P ′(C ′′I − kIP
′) + σ
) , (29)
with σ ≡ R′kI (2P
′kI + P
′′kIqI − C
′′
I ) < 0.
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It follows that
dkj
dk
dkI
dk
< −
C ′′I
qI
kI
ρ(C ′′I − kIP
′)N
if and only if
−
(
N
1 +N
)(
C ′′I P
′ρ qI
kI
+ σ
ρ2P ′(C ′′I − kIP
′) + σ
)
< −
C ′′I
qI
kI
ρ(C ′′I − kIP
′)
. (30)
But the left-hand side of (30) can either be larger or smaller than the right-hand side. To
see this suppose first that σ is small in absolute terms. In this case, the second term of the
left-hand side is approximately the same as the right-hand side. But since −N/(1 +N) > −1,
the left-hand side is larger. On the other hand, suppose that N is very large. In this case,
N/(1+N) is close to 1. We then have that vertical integration is anticompetitive at the margin
if
−
C ′′I P
′ρ qI
kI
+ σ
ρ2P ′(C ′′I − kIP
′) + σ
< −
C ′′I
qI
kI
ρ(C ′′I − kIP
′)
. (31)
Obviously the left-hand side equals the right-hand side if σ = 0. But since σ < 0 and ρ2P ′(C ′′I −
kIP
′) < P ′C ′′I ρ
qI
kI
< 0, the inequality in (31) is fulfilled.
By continuity, there exists either a k∗∗ < k¯ such that for all k > k∗∗ vertical integration is
anticompetitive at the margin or vertical integration is procompetitive at the margin even for
k close to k¯. 
A.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Case (i):
From the proof of Proposition 1 we know that(
dkj
dk
)
(
dkI
dk
) = − ∂
2Πj
∂kj∂kI
∂2Πj
∂k2j
+ (N − 1)
∂2Πj
∂kj∂ki
.
If R′ is dominating all other derivatives in absolute values, we get, after inserting (20), (23)
and (24), that (dkj/dk)/(dkI/dk) = −1/(N +1). Thus, the left-hand side of (7) does not vary
with k.
We now analyze how the right-hand of (7) changes with k. Differentiating it with respect
to k reveals that this derivative has the same sign as
−C ′′jC
′′
I (C
′′
I − kIP
′)(C ′′j − kjP
′)

d
(
qI
kI
)
dk
qj
kj
−
d
(
qj
kj
)
dk
qI
kI

−
−P ′C ′′j C
′′
I
qj
kj
qI
kI
(
(C ′′j − kjP
′)
dkI
dk
− (C ′′I − kIP
′)
dkj
dk
)
− (32)
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−P ′
qj
kj
qI
kI
(
dC ′′j
dk
C ′′I kj(C
′′
I − kIP
′)−
dC ′′I
dk
C ′′j kI(C
′′
j − kjP
′)
)
+P ′′
dQ
dk
C ′′j C
′′
I
qj
kj
qI
kI
(kjC
′′
I − kIC
′′
j ).
From Lemma 4 we know that dkI/dk > 0 and dkj/dk < 0. Because of Lemma 1 this implies
that
d
(
qI
kI
)
dk
< 0 and
d
(
qj
kj
)
dk
> 0.
Therefore, the first two terms in (32) are positive.
Now let us turn to the third term. Since C ′′′ is positive or not very negative, we get that
dC ′′j /dk is also positive or not very negative while dC
′′
I /dk is negative or not very positive.
Therefore, the third term is either positive, or, if it is negative, then only slightly so. As a
consequence, the sum of the first three terms in (32) is positive.
Now let us look at the fourth term. We know that dQ/dk = 0 at any intersection between
the left- and the right-hand side. Therefore, the fourth term is zero at an intersection. But this
implies that the right-hand side is strictly increasing in k at an intersection, and, therefore, it
can cross the left-hand side only from below. Since we know that the right-hand side is smaller
that the left-hand side at k = 0, there can at most be one intersection between the two sides,
which proves the result.
Case (ii):
We first solve for the equilibrium in the linear-quadratic case. The profit function of the
integrated firm in this case can be written as
ΠI =
[
α− βqI − β
N∑
i=1
qi
]
qI −
cq2I
2kI
+ γqI − δ(kI − k)(kI +
N∑
i=1
ki), (33)
and the one of a non-integrated firm j as
ΠI =

α− βqj − βqI − β N∑
i=1,i6=j
qi

 qj − cq2j
2kj
− δkj(kj + kI +
N∑
i=1,i6=j
ki). (34)
Differentiating with respect to qI and qj and solving for the equilibrium quantities yields
qI =
(β (α+ (N + 1)γ) kj + c (γ + α)) kI
β(βkj(N + 2) + 2c)kI + c2 + kjβc(N + 1)
and qj =
(βkI(α− γ) + cα) kj
β(βkj(N + 2) + 2c)kI + c2 + kjβc(N + 1)
.
After substituting these quantities into the respective profit functions, we can take derivatives
of ΠI with respect to kI and of Πj with respect to kj .
25 The equilibrium capacities kI and kj
25As before, we have to differentiate between kj and ki i 6= j, i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}. Of course, in equilibrium we
will have ki = kj .
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are then implicitly defined by
(
c2(c+ kj(1 +N)β)
) (
c2(γ + α)2 + 2c((γ + α)β(α + γ(1 +N))−Nδc2)kj (35)
+β((α + γ(1 +N))2β − 4N(1 +N)δc2)k2j − 2Nδcβ
2(1 +N)2k3j
)
=
4∑
t=1
ktIθt − θ0k,
with
θ0 = 2δ(β
2(2 +N)kjkI + β(N + 1)kjc+ 2βckI + c
2)3,
θ1 = (6β
4δNc(2+N)(1+N)2k4j−β
3((2+3N)(α+(N+1)γ)2β−4δc2(1+N)(7N2+11N+1))k3j−
−2β2c((α+ (N + 1)γ)(3α(N + 1) + γ(3 + 4N))β − 3δc2(7N2 + 10N + 2))k2j−
−βc2((γ + α)((7N + 6)γ + 3α(N + 2))β − 12δc2(2N + 1))kj − 2c
3(β(α + γ)2 − 2δc2)),
θ2 = (6β
5δNc(1 +N)(2 +N)2k4j + 6β
4δc2(2 +N)(N2 + 10N + 2)k3j+
+24β3δc3(2N + 3)(2N + 1)k2j + 12β
2δc4(7N + 6)kj + 24βδc
5),
θ3 = 2β
2δ(k2j β
2N(2 +N) + 2βkjc(4N + 3) + 6c
2)(kjβ(N + 2) + 2c)
2,
θ4 = 4β
3δ(kjβ(N + 2) + 2c)
3,
and
c3(2kIβ + c)(β(−8c
2δ + β(α− γ)2)k2I + 2c(βα(α − γ)− c
2δ)k1 + c
2α2 − 8β2cδk3I )
=
(
(8β4cδ(8 + 3N)k4I − β
3((α − γ)2(6 +N)β − 16c2δ(7 + 4N))k3I− (36)
−β2c((α− γ)((14 + 3N)α − γ(N + 2))β − 18c2δ(3N + 4))k2I+
+c2(kIα(−(3N+10)α−2(N+2)γ)β
2+c(2(9N+10)ckI δ−α
2(N+2))β+2c3δ(N+1)))+
4∑
t=1
ktjτt
)
kj ,
with
τ1 = cβ(12β
4cδ(N + 4)(N + 2)k4I + β
3(−(α− γ)2(2 + 3N)β + 2c2δ(116N + 104 + 27N2))k3I+
+β2c((α− γ)((3N − 1)γ − 3(3 +N)α)β + 6c2δ(39N + 28 + 12N2))k2I+
+βc2(α(2(3N−1)γ−9Nα)β+12c2δ(3N+5)(N+1))kI+c
3(((1−3N)α2)β+2c2δ(3N+4)(N+1))).
τ2 = 2β
2δc((2 +N)kIβ + (N + 1)c)(β
3(N + 8)(N + 2)k3I + cβ
2(8N2 + 45N + 40)k2I+
+2c2β(5N + 14)(N + 1)kI + 3c
3(N + 2)(N + 1)),
τ3 = 2β
3δ((2β2(1+N))k2I +cβ(N +9)(N+1)kI +c
2(N+4)(N +1))((2+N)kIβ+(1+N)c)
2k4j ,
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τ4 = 2β
4δ(N + 1)((N + 2)kIβ + (N + 1)c)
3.
We now turn to the competitive effects of a change in k. Since Q = qI +Nqj, we can insert
the above explicit solutions for the quantities and differentiate Q with respect to k. From this
we get that dQ/dk > 0 if and only if
dkj
dk
dkI
dk
> −
(kjβ + c)(β(γ(N + 1) + α)kj + c(γ + α))
N(kIβ + c)((β(α − γ))kI + cα)
. (37)
Via differentiating (35) and (36) with respect to k, taking into account that kI and kj vary
with k, we can calculate the left-hand side of (37). Subtracting the right-hand side from the
left-hand side yields an expression that has the following structure:
6∑
u=0
5∑
z=0
kuj k
z
Iυuz, (38)
where υuz = υuz(α, β, γ, δ, c,N). We do not spell out the exact expressions for υuz, u ∈ {1, ..., 6},
z ∈ {1, ..., 5} because they are rather complicated. As will become clear, we are mainly inter-
ested in determining their signs and compare them, which is relatively easily possible.
Differentiating (38) with respect to k we get
6∑
u=1
5∑
z=1
υuz
(
zkuj k
z−1
I
dkI
dk
+ uku−1j k
z
I
dkj
dk
)
+
5∑
z=1
υ0zzk
z−1
I
dkI
dk
+
6∑
u=1
υu0uk
u−1
j
dkj
dk
,
where, from Lemma 4, dkj/dk < 0 and dkI/dk > 0.
First, one can show that all υuz > 0 if u > z. Then calculating υuz(zk
u
j k
z−1
I (dkI/dk) +
uku−1j k
z
I (dkj/dk)) for u > z reveals that all these expressions are negative. The expressions for
υuz with u < z can have different signs. So let us first take each term υuz(zk
u
j k
z−1
I (dkI/dk) +
uku−1j k
z
I (dkj/dk)), where z = za > ua = u. Now we compare it with the corresponding
expression where u = za and z = ua. One can then show that the latter expression is larger
than the former in absolute values in any comparison. Therefore, the sum of each of the
comparisons is negative. Finally, we have to look at terms with u = z. Again, υuz can be
positive or negative, i.e. υuz > 0 for u = z = 1, 2, 3, υuz < 0 for u = z = 4 and υuz = 0 for
u = z = 5. Now for any of these expressions υuz(zk
u
j k
z−1
I (dkI/dk) + uk
u−1
j k
z
I (dkj/dk)) with
u = z we can find a previous comparison, to which we can add the expression and the resulting
sum still stays negative. Thus, equation (38) is strictly decreasing in k. Since at k = 0, the
left-hand side of (37) is larger than the right-hand side, we know that there exists either a
unique intersection or no intersection between the terms on the two sides. 
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A.8 Proof of Proposition 4
We first show that qj → 0 and kj → 0, j ∈ {1, ..., N}, as N → ∞. Suppose to the contrary
that qj > 0. But since Q = qI +Nqj and P (Q) ≤ 0, as N → ∞, the first-order condition for
firm j given by (1) cannot be satisfied if qj > 0, since the right-hand side would be positive
while the left-hand side would be negative. Therefore, qj → 0, as N →∞. Given this, suppose
now that kj > 0. But then in the first-order condition of the capacity stage, (4), the left-hand
side would be negative while the right-hand side is zero. In order to fulfill this condition we
must have kj → 0. Therefore, as N →∞, qj → 0 and kj → 0.
In the proof of Proposition 4 we already calculated the case of qj → 0 and kj → 0. Taking
in addition N →∞ we get from (30) that vertical integration is anticompetitive if
−
C ′′I P
′ρ qI
kI
+ σ
ρ2P ′(C ′′I − kIP
′) + σ
< −
C ′′I
qI
kI
ρ(C ′′I − kIP
′)
,
where ρ and σ are defined in the proof of Proposition 2. But we already showed in this proof
that the inequality is fulfilled. Therefore, vertical integration is anticompetitive if N →∞. 
A.9 Proof of Proposition 5
We start with the case where k = 0 and γ = 0. In the proof of Proposition 1 we calculated the
left-hand of (9). To determine the right-hand side of (9) we first insert dQ/dkI = dqI/dkI +
Ndqj/dkI , dQ−I/dkI = Ndqj/dkI and dQ/dkj = dqI/dkj + dqj/dkj + (N − 1)dqj/dkI into the
right-hand side and then use equations (13), (14), (15), (18) and (19) from the proof of Lemma
1, i.e. the derivatives of qi with respect to kj , i, j ∈ {I, 1, ..., N}. Knowing that at k = 0 and
γ = 0 we have qI = qj, kI = kj and C
′′
I = C
′′
j , the right-hand side simplifies to −1/N . But from
the proof of Proposition 1 we know that the left-hand side is larger than −1/N at k = 0 and
γ = 0. Therefore, marginal vertical integration is welfare increasing at this point. In the same
way as in the proof of Proposition 1 we can show that it is also welfare increasing for γ > 0.
By continuity there exists a threshold k∗W such that vertical integration is welfare enhancing
at the margin for all k < k∗W .
Now we turn to the case where k = k¯. From the proof of Proposition 2 we know that in
this case
dkj
dk
dkI
dk
= −
C ′′I P
′α qI
kI
+ β
(N + 1)
(
α2P ′(C ′′I − kIP
′) + β
) .
Proceeding in the same way as above to determine the right-hand side of (9) but now inserting
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k = k¯, qj = kj = 0 yields
−
P ′q2IC
′′
I − kI(C
′′
I − kI(2P
′ + qIP
′′)(kI − k)
P ′qIk2IN(P
′ + qiP ′′)
. (39)
Subtracting (39) from (dkj/dk)/(dkI/dk) then yields
−k2I
(
−2kIP
′ − kIP
′′qI + C
′′
I
)2
(1 +N) (R′)2+
+P ′
(
−2 kIP
′ − kIP
′′qI + C
′′
I
) ((
q2I + k
2
Iα
2
)
(1 +N)C ′′I − k
2
I
(
q2INP
′′ + P ′
(
kIα
2 + kINα2 +NqI
)))
R′−
−C ′′I (P
′)2q2Iα
(
−kIP
′ (α+Nα+N)− kINP
′′qI + αC
′′
I (1 +N)
)
+ (40)
+R′kI
(
2 kIP
′ + kIP
′′qI − C
′′
I
) (
R′qIkIP
′′ − kI(P ′)2α2 + 2 kIR
′P ′ + P ′α2C ′′I −R
′C ′′I
)
(1 +N) k¯.
The first three terms in this expression are negative while the last term is positive. Therefore,
if the ex ante capacity that is needed to induce the non-integrated firms to stop producing, k¯,
is small, the expression is negative and welfare is decreasing at k = k¯. By continuity there then
exists a k∗∗W such that for all k > k
∗∗
W vertical integration is reducing welfare at the margin. If
instead k¯ is large, the expression is positive and vertical integration is welfare enhancing at the
margin. 
A.10 Proof of Proposition 6
Case (i):
From (9) we know that vertical integration enhances welfare if
N
[
−P ′
(
qj
dQ
dkj
+ (N − 1)qj
dqi
dkj
+ qI
dqI
dkj
)
+R′kj
](
dkj
dk
)
+ (41)
+
(
−P ′
(
qI
dQ
dkI
+ qj
dQ−I
dkI
)
+R′(kI − k)
)(
dkI
dk
)
> 0.
If R′ is dominating all other derivatives, we can calculate dkj/dk and dkI/dk from (26) and
(27) to get
dkj
dk
= −
1
N + 2
and
dkI
dk
=
N + 1
N + 2
. (42)
Inserting this into the last expression and using the fact that R′ is dominating all other deriva-
tives yields
Nkj + (N + 1)(k − kI)
N + 2
R′ > 0.
Differentiating the left-hand side of the last equation with respect to k and using (42) yields
d
(
Nkj+(N+1)(k−kI)
N+2 R
′
)
dk
= −
1
(N + 2)2
R′ < 0.
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Therefore, the term that determines the sign of (41) is strictly decreasing in k. Since welfare
is increasing in k at k = 0, there is either a unique intersection point or none.
The proof for case (ii) proceeds along the same lines as the proof of case (ii) in Proposition
3 and is therefore omitted. 
A.11 Proof of Proposition 7
From (8) we know that welfare is increasing in k if and only if
P
dQ
dk
−NCj
dkj
dk
−NkjC
′
j
(
1
kj
dqj
dk
−
qj
k2j
dkj
dk
)
− (43)
−CI
dkI
dk
− kIC
′
I
(
1
kI
dqI
dk
−
qI
k2I
dkI
dk
)
+ γ
dqI
dk
−R
dK
dk
> 0.
The first term on the left-hand side, PdQ/dk, has the same sign as the condition for pro- or
anticompetitive vertical integration. Therefore, we know that it is zero at k∗. As a consequence,
if the rest of the left-hand side is negative at k∗, this would imply that k∗WF < k
∗.
We start with the case of γ = 0. In this case the term γ(dqI/dk) = 0. The term −R(dK/dk)
is negative since overall capacity is increasing in k. Thus, if the terms
−NCj
dkj
dk
−NkjC
′
j
(
1
kj
dqj
dk
−
qj
k2j
dkj
dk
)
− CI
dkI
dk
− kIC
′
I
(
1
kI
dqI
dk
−
qI
k2I
dkI
dk
)
(44)
are negative at k∗, we have established that k∗WF < k
∗ at γ = 0. We can now use the respective
expressions for the cost functions and the equilibrium values of qj and qI in the linear-quadratic
case that we calculated in the proof of Proposition 3, case (ii). Inserting them into (44) yields
that the sign of this expression is given by the sign of
−
[
Nα2(c+βkI)
(
k2Iβ
2(2c− βkj(N + 2)) + kIcβ(c − βkj(2N + 5)) + c
2α(c − βkj(N + 1))
)] dkjdk
dkI
dk
−
(45)
−α2 [c+ kjβ]
[
k2j
(
β2c(N + 1)− kIβ
3(N + 2)
)
+kjcβ (c(2 −N)− kIβ(3N + 4))−2kIc
2β+c3
]
.
From (37) we know that dQ/dk = 0 at γ = 0, if k implies equilibrium values of kI and kj such
that
dkj
dk
dkI
dk
= −
(kjβ + c)α(βkj + c)
N(kIβ + c)α(βkI + c)
.
Inserting the last equation into (45) and simplifying gives
−
2cβ(kI − kj)(c+ βkj) (kIβ(2c + kjβ(N + 2)) + c(c+ kjβ(N + 1)))
(c+ βkI)
,
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which is negative because kI > kj at k
∗. Thus, we have shown that k∗WF < k
∗ at γ = 0.
Now we turn to the case in which γ 6= 0. We know that dQ/dk = 0 at k = k∗. We can then
write (43) under the linear-quadratic specification for the case of k = k∗ as
−
k2jk
2
I̺
(kIβ(2c + kjβ(N + 2)) + c(c+ kjβ(N + 1)))
3+
+cγ
(c + βkj(N + 1))(c(α + γ) + αβkj + βγkj(N + 1))− kIβN(αc + βkI(α− γ))
(
dkj
dk
/
dkI
dk
)
(kIβ(2c + kjβ(N + 2)) + c(c + kjβ(N + 1)))
2 −
(46)
−d(kI +Nkj)(N
(
dkj
dk
/dkI
dk
)
+ 1),
with
̺ ≡
[
N(αc+ βkI(α− γ))
(
k2Iβ
2(α− γ)(2c − βkj(N + 2)) +
+kIcβ(c(α − 3γ)− βkj(α(2N + 5) + γ(N + 1))) + c
2α(c− βkj(N + 1))
](dkj
dk
/dkI
dk
)
+
+ [c(α + γ) + kjαβ + βγkj(N + 1)]
[
k2j (α+ γ(N + 1))
(
β2c(N + 1)− kIβ
3(N + 2)
)
+
+kjcβ (c(2(α + γ)−N(α− 2γ)) − kIβ(α(3N + 4) + γ(N + 4)))− 2kIc
2β(α+ γ) + c3(α+ γ)
]
.
From (37) we have that (dkj/dk)/(dkI/dk) at k = k
∗ is given by
dkj
dk
dkI
dk
= −
(kjβ + c)(β(γ(N + 1) + α)kj + c(γ + α))
N(kIβ + c)((β(α − γ))kI + cα)
.
Inserting this into (46), differentiating the resulting expression with respect to γ and using the
fact that dkI/dγ > 0 and dkj/dγ < 0 reveals that the expression is strictly increasing in γ.
But from the first part of the proof we know that (46) evaluated at k = k∗ is negative at γ = 0
which implies that k∗WF < k
∗. Therefore, we have shown there exists either a unique value of
γ denoted by γˆ such that k∗WF < k
∗ for all γ < γˆ and k∗WF > k
∗ for all γ > γˆ, or no such value
exists because (46) turns positive only at such high values of γ at which the non-integrated
firms are not active. In the latter case k∗WF < k
∗ for all γ. 
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